The problems of law interpretation have often drawn attention of many scientists (Bertrall, 2014) . Still, the analysis of its impact on the legislation and its enforcement within different historical epochs remains insufficient.
In this article we will try to bridge in some way the gap by focusing on theoretical studies in the law interpretation made by supporters of the natural law doctrine within the period of Modern Era in Western Europe and on their implementation.
In the history of state and law as well as in political and legal theories, the Modern Era is characterized by an active establishment and development of the major law schools. There was a final approval of the legislation as the main source of law, which, in its turn, was gradually seeking to embody the natural law attitudes.
It is an interesting point here, that the reason for the natural law development should be considered as the result of resistance of "German legal awareness to Roman Law enforcement" (Erlikh, 2011: 418) , to its massiveness and unwieldiness: if Romans deduced general principles and provisions from the content of numerous legal norms, then members of the natural law school rather chose the opposite tack, i.e. first, they defined basic principles and values and by following them formed and interpreted the legislation.
One of the most prominent supporters of this theory was Hugo Grotius, a Dutch scientist. In his famous treatise "On the Law of War and Peace:
Three books" he touched upon the issue of law interpretation. Thus, he emphasized, that in that case the interpretation of legal norms according to the requirement of natural law is more preferable (Grotius, 1994: 30) . One of the grounds for the natural law is represented by the idea of justice.
By developing this point, Grotius pays particular attention to injustice and ranks all the things that are contrary enough to the reasonable and sociable nature of a person. On the basis of this statement, the natural law interpretation should be based on the principle of justice, and, consequently, be consistent with the reasonable and social human character.
The importance of this principle was marked also by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a French enlightener. Given that a law maker in his work should follow the principle of justice, so this principle should also be applied by an interpreter under the meaning translation. In Rousseau's perception, the laws are acts of our common will. Thus, their interpretation should be made basing not on interests of the person, but on one of the whole society. As the philosopher sees it, only the law maker can better than anyone else interpret laws and know how they should be effectively enforced (Rousseau, 1969: 118) . In this way, Rousseau advocates an authentic interpretation of the legal norms.
The same point of view was supported by B. Spinoza. By emphasizing his adherence to the natural law and allowing disregard of the law, which conflicted with his ideas, the philosopher thinks, that the law interpreter can be just the subject, who wields the supreme power, and only that person can resolve the problem of conflict or consistency of a norm to the natural law and cope with the issue of violation or expression of the common good. For this reason, the decisionmaking right on non-application of the law, which contradicts the natural law requirements, belongs only to supreme authorities (Spinoza, 1957: 567).
However, as the researches show, understanding of the common good and virtue differs depending on nations, countries and epochs. This fact was mentioned by Voltaire. In seeking to identify a common rule, Voltaire notes, the commonwealth should be the only measure of moral good and evil, for the sake of which people must correct their own ideas of right and wrong. Within the theoretical discourse of Montesquieu, one can also see the interpretation rules, enabling, as he sees it, the law "spirit" to be correctly understood. He wrote about a necessity for the law to be fitted with the nature and principles of the established government (or the one under establishment), physical features of the state, national life-style, degree of its freedom, religion, social customs and habits caused by the circumstances of its genesis (Montesquieu, 1955: 168) .
It makes sense, that acceptance of such points as a common rule both for the law-makers and law-enforcers, significantly facilitates the work of interpreters, since within an ambiguity or non-transparency the content of norms makes it possible to formulate or choose such an interpretation that would meet all the mentioned points, and, thus, would allow implementation of the law-maker's real will.
We can say, that Montesquieu gives a priority to literal interpretation, since, as he says, "if the trial bench should not remain unchanged, then its sentences must be unchanged, so as to keep them always being able to express the law text" (Montesquieu, 1955: 196) .
In "The Spirit of the Laws" Montesquieu states a number of rules for the legal engineering.
In his analysis, the laws should be compressed; avoid "going into details", since only then they can serve as a "model of precision"; and besides, they must be written in the direct language: explicit expressions are always easier to be understood, than the subtle ones. The laws must be available for a unified understanding: "The key term is that words in law should evoke in different people one and the same notions.
The law should reflect a common rule: when there is no need in exceptions, limitations or modifications, so it is better to deal without them, since "such details cause new details".
Moreover, the laws should be made for the social benefit and should not give a rise to avoid them.
By expressing a view, that the law contents should be concise and explicit, Montesquieu, nevertheless, was hostile to their loose interpretation, pointing out that the content of court sentences must be written so as they would remain a precise application of the law. The court's subjectivity, as the philosopher claims, is unacceptable; otherwise, "people would have to live without a precise notion of obligations imposed on them by the society" (Montesquieu, 1955: 413) . Montesquieu says about the social benefit as such purpose. Thus, as he sees it, the interpreter should prefer the one interpretation that provides actualization of this benefit in a more complete way.
The problems of law interpretation were also addressed by C. Beccaria, though he considered them in so far as they were related to the criminal law. The scientist argues against a distinction between such notions as the "letter" and "spirit" of the law. According to his view, it is dangerous to be guided by the "spirit" of the law, since the human nature is quite fickle, subjected to changes in opinions, to influence of internal and external factors, i.e. to reasonable or bad logics of the judge, to how well his stomach works, to his weaknesses and passions, to his attitude towards a victim. Thus, the guidance by the "spirit" of law, depending on the human character and interests, makes a defendant's destiny conditional on them. In such cases judges do not listen to the "permanent and desperate voice of the law, but go by the fallible and changeable interpretation". In this case, a strong adherence to the "letter" of law, as Beccaria claims, has much less disadvantages, than the "spirit' interpretation, since it guarantees personal safety and gives an opportunity to be more careful in inconveniencies caused by illegal behavior (Beccaria, 1995: 81) .
Calling the law interpretation as evil, Beccaria notes, that their "darkness", which, namely, makes people call for interpretation, is no less wrong. Due to this fact, the analyst suggests for the law texts a demand for clarity and availability, so for this aim, they must be written in the language acceptable to people. As he grounds, understanding of the legal requirements will reduce the level of crime (Beccaria, 1995: 83). The law ambiguity will "further contribute to laziness and stupidity". That is the reason why a strong and courageous nation should get rid of such disadvantage as uncertainty in the law" (Beccaria, 1995: 208) .
The same as Rousseau, Beccaria thought, that the law interpretation should be only authentic, and the literal results of this interpretation should be applied by judges. Thus, a judge, even following the principle of justice, has no right to impose a penalty which is not fixed in the law. Moreover, taking into consideration the gravity of criminal nature of this problem, Beccaria excludes the loose interpretation, since a "more severe sentence" the other that is fixed in the law, can probably be fair, but yet "it is another sentence" (Beccaria, 1995: 69) , and thus, it violates the law, that is unacceptable even within the social benefit. Commutation of the sentence fixed in the law is also unacceptable, because, as he claims, judges must be unforgiving and follow only the law text. Mercy, in its turn, is a prerogative of the law-maker -the only person who can translate it within the legal norms (Beccaria, 1995: 246) .
In general, C. Beccaria notes that judges are obliged to a literal guidance and not to the law interpretation, on the basis that they are not the law-makers. The judges are aimed at a logical structuring of only one right syllogism, because if there is more than one, it will generate loopholes of uncertainty. The power of interpretation must be given only to a sovereign as a "protector of his nationals' will", since the laws represent "the result of the free will expression" of his contemporaries (Beccaria, 1995: 72) .
It worth mentioning, that even in the Modern
Era some provisions of the natural law doctrine start to gain setting in the legislation. Though, the necessity of their implementation in the legal norms also had different justifications.
Thus, the desire to apply the principle of humanity can be seen through the example of interpretation in favor of the Inquisition abolishing in France. In that case, O. Nicolas, the Chair of the Dijon Parliament, claimed that torture was not a method to get the truth in the serious crimes; it prevented us from obtaining truthful testimonies, since they "escape" from the offender through the inflicted pain; and it contradicted against the requirement of the "natural equality" and "equity of the common law" (Cheltsov-Bebutov, 1995: 453). The torture was opposed by: Beccaria, Montesquieu who considered, that it "fails to satisfy the nature", and by Voltaire. The latter one even assumed it had been introduced by the thieves, who broke into the house of a miser and having failed to find any treasure, tortured him until he said their place (Voltaire, 1956: 204 ).
It appears that pursuance of the natural law fixation and researches which understand tortures as being non-corresponded with these perceptions, caused the fact that the torture was officially abolished in France in 1780; it was also confirmed in 1789 by the National Assembly. The Court of Cassation in France, which reviewed the case in 1899, concluded that the affair had not one, but many fake documents.
The note, which was handed to the judges as the ground for conviction, had been showed neither to the accused, nor to his defender at the pretrial investigation. Schwarzkoppen, to whom the bordereau was addressed, announced in the press that he in fact had dealt with Esterhazy. Moreover, the affair-makers considering Schwarzkoppen -a German person -as the author of letters, persuaded him to make a number of cardinal mistakes in the French grammar. As it was revealed later, he was born in Alsace and had a good command of French. This fact finally convinced in forged documents against Dreyfus.
Even the German Government officially declared in "Reichsanzeiger" that it had never dealt with Dreyfus. At the same time, his prosecutors failed to present any other proofs, except those that already had been in the affair. Still, despite these facts, the Court of Cassation also found Dreyfus guilty, but under the mitigating circumstances.
Nevertheless, Dreyfus was granted a pardon by the President.
The affair was re-examined in the 1903, when the Chamber of Deputies found a letter from General Pellieux, one of Dreyfus's prosecutors, dated on 31 August, 1898 and containing the information about the falsehood in this affair.
Having read the controversial case, General
Andre, the Minister of War, commented on the necessity of re-investigation. In November, 1903 after Dreyfus's filing of a new claim, the affair was examined once again by the Court of Cassation.
As the result, the captain was fully justified (// http://www.rudata.ru/wiki).
A widespread concern in the society and to be contempt and can make mistakes", and the sabre "is worthy of any respect and always right". As the judge sees it, if he had found the policeman being wrong, that would have hurt him and contradicted the spirit of law (France, 1936: 251, 254 does not involve its reversal, provided that it has been awarded in a wrong way and will not cause a re-trial relating to the acquitted person, but ends only with its registration of the court that has imposed the wring sentence (Garraud, 1926 (Garraud, : 1021 . This fact answers only for pointing out violations and wrong interpretations of the law to the corresponding court. It should also be mentioned, that this process continues even at the present time.
